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Introduction
The nuts and bolts of setting monetary policy are often hard to get across to students. There are a number of key hurdles to overcome.
First, the conceptual idea of how setting interest rates may (or may not) act to stabilise an economy comprising many households, …rms, …nancial institutions and a signi…cant government sector. Secondly, there are a host of institutional details to convey such as the framework for monetary policy, the relationship between the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank and what might be the ultimate objectives of stabilisation policy. Thirdly, the theory of monetary policy is itself really developing into a branch of 'robust' control theory and so is subject to severe technical barriers at the frontier. 1 And …nally, there is the aspect of the real data: how do we convey the idea that the observed economy is not some clearly identi…able mass but a construct based upon a myriad of observations or surveys announced on a daily basis? The mixture of institutional detail, high theory, data and, at times, low politics makes monetary policy courses a daunting mix for instructor and student alike.
We tend to start monetary policy courses with an analogy related to one of driving cars, steering ships or taking a shower! In which, the policy maker is cast as the driver, pilot or bather in question. But the user has severe information problems, he (or she) cannot know with a high degree of certainty where he might currently be compared to where he would like to be. He also does not quite know how the machine will react when he asks it to help him get to where he would like to be. Finally, it may also be some time before he realises that he is or is not where he thinks he would like to be and so he may frequently under or even overshoot his …nal destination. Should your head be reeling, you would now be pleased to know that I have chosen to side-step almost entirely these kinds of control issues in this chapter.
What will concern us mostly in this chapter is the rather prosaic set of issues to do with where should interest rates go if the economy has a demand-induced boom, a supply induced contraction or indeed if in ‡ation expectations become dislodged. 2 These questions will be considered within the context of a simple two-quadrant and then four- 1 As well as the hurdle of deriving aggregate relationships from …rst principles (so-called micro-foundatations), the resulting equations need to be understood and manipulated to examine issues such a determinacy, learnability and various solutions for the policy rule can be examined according to various loss functions for the monetary policy maker. For example, rather than the well known quadratic loss function which seeks to minimise the deviations of a variable from its target, a policy maker may seek to minimise the losses from the worst possible (probable) outcome and act with a so-called min-max loss function. Appendix A.3 illustrates the connection between the choice of loss function and the optimal monetary policy rule. See Alan Greenspan (2004) for an introduction to how risk managment issues impact on simple monetary policy decisions. 2 By which I mean dislodged from their (model-based) connection with the state of the economy. quadrant diagram that I will develop and use to explore directly two further monetary policy issues: how might the zero-bound for interest rates complicate the monetary policy problem and how might money market shocks complicate monetary policy choices? The level of exposition is appropriate for good undergraduates and I introduce many key readings in modern macroeconomics. In Section 2, I write down a standard New Keynesian model appended with both a supply side, money market clearing condition and a term for the price level as well as in ‡ation. I develop the simple conditions for the determinacy of this system and show that it implies a monetary policy reaction where policy rates rise more than equiproportionally with in ‡ation, the socalled 'Taylor Principle'of active monetary policy. Once the existence of an equilibrium for this economy has been established I return to the policy experiments. For the more technically grounded students the Appendix gives a fuller derivation.
In Section 3, I represent the key relationships diagrammatically for an in ‡ation targeting central bank and consider the appropriate responses to three static problems of a positive demand shock, a negative supply shock and an increase in in ‡ation expectations. In each case, I show that policy (interest) rates will have to rise temporarily to bring in ‡ation back to target. In Section 4, I consider two special cases: what happens to the monetary policy reaction function when nominal rates are bounded at zero and when the money market may directly provide perturbations because the economy may be considered more or less risky over time. In the former case, policy rates are shown to be unable to drive real rates lower as in ‡ation falls and thus there appear to be 'real'limits to the e¢ cacy of interest rates as a stabilisation device under a low and/or falling in ‡ation. In the latter case, I show that a disconnect between interest rates set in the private money markets and policy rates can setup independent deviations of aggregate demand from potential and so require some o¤setting in monetary policy.
With this background exposition in the student's toolkit I conclude that it becomes easier to consider the questions of diagnosis of any given monetary policy problem, institutional development, to track real-time data developments and to consider more complicated games that the policy makers may have to play with their various (ir)rational counterparts. I leave that analysis to more advanced courses.
The Basic New Keynesian Model with Money
The point of departure for a simple macroeconomic model suitable for monetary policy analysis has become the New Keynesian (NK) framework (see McCallum (2001) and King (2002) ), which is essentially an aggregate model with dominant supply side dynamics but where sticky prices mean that output may deviate temporarily from its ‡ex-price long run level. The possibility of temporary deviations in output from its ‡ex-price level creates a role for the monetary policy maker. In brief, the basic NK story is that the capacity of output is set by a production function based on usual arguments in land and capital with its accumulation of e¢ ciency shocks (the so-called Solow residuals see, for example, 1987) and short run output is determined by a monopolistically competitive supply side faced with Calvo time dependent price setting. The NK structure means that the full capacity level of output in this economy lies at a point behind the perfectly competitive frontier, which in principle provides an incentive to push the economy above its full capacity level. 3 Secondly, with prices adjusting only gradually to an optimal mark-up over evolving marginal costs, short run output can deviate from this capacity level. Following any shocks, prices can only be re-set in each period by the fraction of …rms who are sent an exogenous (Calvo) signal to re-price -with the fraction given by 1 in each time period. And so all other …rms, , are faced with having to accept a sub-optimal price for their output for at least one period and the overall price level, which is a linear combination of all …rms'prices, is also sub-optimal, which means that there are both distributional and direct output consequences from sticky prices.
In ‡ation is driven by both the di¤erence between capacity and the short run aggregate level of production chosen by all …rms and expected in ‡ation. And so in ‡ation, at least in its temporary deviations from target, is not a monetary phenomenom in this model but really an output gap phenomenom, which is itself controlled by interest rate choices. But nevertheless to this basic model we can also consider appending a simple model of money demand (for which supply by the monetary policy maker is implicitly perfectly elastic), where we assume that households need to hold money balances to meet a given level of planned nominal expenditures. The role of the policy maker is to set interest rates so that output stabilises at the capacity level, that is the so-called output gap is closed, at which point in ‡ation is also stabilised. In the remainder of this section I list and explain the key dynamic equations and examine the policymakers'problem in terms of the determinacy of equilibrium.
The simple New Keynesian model expresses each variables as its log deviation from steady-state. Equation (1) gives aggregate demand, y t , as a function of this period's expectation, E t ; of demand next period, y t+1 , and of the expected real interest rate, where R t is the policy rate, E t t+1 is the next period expectation of in ‡ation and is the intertemporal rate of substitution in output. 4 Equation (2) is the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve that relates current in ‡ation, t , to discounted expected next period in ‡ation, where is the subjective discount factor, and is proportional to the deviation of aggregate demand from supply, where is the slope of the Phillips curve. 5 The term is related to two deep parameters in the underlying Calvo-Yun model (see Yun, 1996) : the probability of …rms maintaining a …xed price in the next period, , and the subjective discount factor, : In in ‡ation space can be shown to be equal to ) and thus in price space, with the deviation in the price level proportional to in ‡ation (see equation 6), the Phillips curve becomes:
Under either formulation in ‡ation or the price level is less responsive to the output gap as ! 1:
Equation (3) says that real balances, m t p t , are held in proportion to demand, y t , and inversely with the opportunity cost of holding noninterest paying money, R t , with a semi-elasticity, . Equation (4) is a simple interest rate-based rule that is used to stabilise in ‡ation about its steady state value with the weight on in ‡ation given by . The supply side of the economy,ỹ t , which we interpret as the ‡ex-price, or steadystate, level of output is given by (5) . The shocks to this equation account for changes in the short run deviation of ‡ex-price output from its steadystate and can typically be interpreted as productivity, or e¢ ciency, shocks. Finally, the forward-looking Phillips curve, (2) , determines the split between current and expected in ‡ation as a function of the current output gap but we can use the current in ‡ation rate to back out the price level: is the fraction of …rms that hold prices …xed and so (1 ) is the fraction which are given a signal to re-price as a mark-up over marginal costs (see Yun, 1996) thus in ‡ation is simply the ratio of …rms that reprice at the new price level, p t , relative to those that cannot re-price, (6). 4 This intertemporal equation also operates as the basic asset pricing equation, or kernel, in a New-Keynesian model. 5 This compares to various speci…cations of the Phillips curve through time, relating …rstly the in ‡ation rate to the unemployment rate and then the change in in ‡ation to various measures of capacity. The key di¤erence here is that the impact of the output gap is split between current and expected in ‡ation. It is worth reading Bill Phillips (1958) original paper. 6 Equation (6) is the deviation of in ‡ation and prices from steady state and results from the observation that P t+n = f [ P t 1+n ; (1 ) P t+n ] and so if prices are at steady state in the initial period under Calvo pricing.they will move by the ratio of The system is subject to stochastic shocks, A;t , B;t , C;t , D;t , which are respectively to demand, mark-up, monetary policy and to aggregate supply.
We can substitute (4) into (1) and into (3), (5) into (2) and solving (6) for p t into (3) to give us a system of four di¤erence equations that can be written in vector form, if we suppress the stochastic errors, as:
where the transpose of the vector of state variables x t is:
where is a 4 x 4 matrix of parameters. And so the basic NK model can be boiled down a set of equations linking output and in ‡ation to money and prices via the determination of nominal interest rates.
Understanding the model dynamics
A question that …rst concerns macroeconomists when faced with such a model are the 'Blanchard-Kahn local stability conditions', 7 to locate a rational expectations solution to a forward-looking macroeconomic model. In fact much modern macroeconomic theory is concerned with those who can re-price to those who cannot. 7 See Blanchard and Kahn, 1980, which triggered most of the modern work on assessing whether an equilibrium is locally stable.
the conditions under which a given model has a solution, or analogously can be thought to be stable following economic shocks. The existence or not of a unique solution for x t , given the forcing processes, t , 8 and will depend upon matching the number of eigenvalues (or roots) of the matrix within the unit circle (less than absolute value of 1) with the number of predetermined state variables. 9 Predetermined variables are those that we might think of as backward looking and depend upon shocks in previous periods or decisions in previous periods for the attainment of their current levels. On the other hand non-predetermined (also known as forward-looking, or jump variables) depend upon expectational terms for the current value. Note from equations (1) and (2) that both in ‡ation and output are determined with reference to expectations of their own future values and so are non-predetermined variable. This is a key feature of NK macroeconomics, that many of the key variables behave like asset prices rather than traditionally sluggish prices and quantities. This means that the NK economy is somewhat more ‡exible, faster adjusting, than an examination of the data on a typical economy might suggest. 10 One way to think of the policy problem is that it is necessary to set the coe¢ cients of the policy rule, (4), to ensure local determinacy of the whole system, and this setting is a¤ected by the extent to which key variables are forward-looking. 11 We can see from inspection of equations (1) to (6) how the structure of this economy responds to shocks. Demand and mark-up shocks, A;t and B;t , immediately impact on output and in ‡ation, respectively and shocks to the policy rate and supply-side, C;t and D;t ; also work their way through output and in ‡ation. We can thus see that providing some conditions are met so that in ‡ation and output stabilise after shocks, by which I mean return to their steady-state or target values, then money and prices will also be stabilised. Equation (3) shows that the demand for real balances will be satis…ed providing output and the interest rate is stable, which itself is a function of in ‡ation in this simple model. Furthermore equation (6) tells us that a stable path for in ‡ation will also stabilise the price level.
The model is therefore recursive (see the Appendix for a fuller proof) and consequently monetary policy makers have concentrated on 8 Which is an analagous 4 x 1 vector for the shocks. 9 I shall not continue with much matrix algebra in this section but the interested reader is directed to the Appendix for more details. 10 For example, a rule of thumb for central banks is that the economy responds most actively with a lag of 4-8 quarters to a monetary policy shock but that tends to be considerably longer than that suggested by a typical NK model. 11 See Woodford (2003) for a comprehensive treatment of this problem.
determining stability by concentrating on the output gap and in ‡ation dynamics. And arguing that the traditional 'bread and butter' of monetary policy, monetary aggregates, impart little or no further information because the observed market clearing levels of money supply are equilibrium outcomes, re ‡ecting stable paths for output and in ‡ation contingent on the policy rule, which therefore have no further information to impart about the state of the economy. The idea that our observations on the economy, that is the time series we have on money, output, in ‡ation and interest rates, are always equilibrium outcomes begs the very di¢ cult question of what models we can use that will simultaneously produce market clearing in all markets and still match the data.
In ‡ation-output dynamics
Let us examine the conditions (somewhat loosely) for the determination of monetary stability. 12 First suppress the stochastic terms from equations (1) and (2):
Solve (2) for E t t+1 and substitute out the policy rate from (4) to give:
Now simplify the expression by assuming that = 1 and that 1:
At steady state the growth rate of output around the trend will be zero and so:
12 For a full account see Appendix A. 3. which means that output will be at steady-state providing the following condition is satis…ed:
which we note will be positively sloped if < 1 and negatively sloped if the weight on in ‡ation in the interest rate rule is greater than one. We can think of these alternate rules for monetary policy as passive and active, respectively (see, Leeper, 1991) . Note that under a passive rule a positive shock to in ‡ation will imply that output will rise and hence through the Phillips curve will generate higher in ‡ation in this and subsequent periods, that is in ‡ation will not be stabilised and will continue to escalate. 13 But the active rule will imply that higher in ‡ation will be associated with lower output and this will continue to drive down future in ‡ation until it is also back to target. In this way the crucial aspect of this system's determinacy is the adoption of an active rule in the monetary policy maker's reaction function.
To sum up, in this section, I have set out a modern macroeconomic model. There is an important but largely hidden supply-side based on a Cobb-Douglas production function and the Solow residual to provide a measure of productivity growth, which is basically treated as exogenous. In ‡ation is set by a Phillips curve and demand responds to the expected path of real interest rates. The stability of this economy depends on the monetary policy reaction function, which moves to stabilise in ‡ation via the output gap. The stability of this system can also be said to be recursive in that as long as in ‡ation and output are pinned down to a unique solution path then the money stock and the price level are also determined in each period. I have also explored a simple exposition of how the adoption of an active rule will stabilise this economy. In the following Section, I will create some simple toolkit diagrams, which can be used to understand the setting of monetary policy.
Toolkit Policy Diagrams
I can now represent the key elements of this model within the context of a simple set of quadrant style diagrams. In which the target in ‡ation 13 The argument is the same for a negative in ‡ation shock whereby the active policy rule will ensure that output is higher in future periods but there is a downward constraint as nominal interest rates cannot go below zero. I discuss this lacuna in the section on the zero-bound.
rate is determined by a monetary policy maker using the interest rate as a tool of stabilisation. In this section we will develop this diagram and also consider the appropriate policy response to a positive demand shock, a negative supply shock and the possibility of dislodged (from fundamentals) in ‡ation expectations.
Basic steady-state equations
The simple model outlined in equations (1) to (6) explained the dynamics of an economy around some steady-state or target level. In this section, we brie ‡y outline those steady-states so that we can depict the economy in a diagrammatic form. At steady-state or target values there will be no expected deviation of output, y t , from its ‡ex-price level and so y t = E t y t+1 ; and in ‡ation will equal expected in ‡ation, which in turn will equal the target level of in ‡ation, t = E t t+1 = T and assuming that = 1 and 1, we can examine the steady state as follows:
0 = E t t+1 t = (y t ỹ t ) ; y =ỹ:
Equations (14) and (15) tell us that at steady state, where there is no expected deviation of in ‡ation or output from its target, T ; or potential value,ỹ, the nominal interest rate will deviate from the long run real rate of interest (the so-called Wicksellian rate of interest) 14 by the in ‡ation target and output will be equal to its potential with the output gap at zero. The money market will thus clear as follows:
14 The Wicksellian rate of interest is explored in other chapters in this volume but essentially is the real rate of interest consistent with ( ‡ex-price) equilibrium ‡uctuations in output. Equation (16) tells us that money will be held to …nance steady-state demand for steady-state output,ỹ, and in direct proportion to the price level minus an 'in ‡ation tax'term, T , because for any positive in ‡ation target there is a steady-state disincentive to hold money balances. This is because the negative of the target in ‡ation rate, T , is equal to return on money holdings, when money balances yield no monetary return. We are now in a position to draw our two-quadrant diagram for interest rate determination and for output determination. For the moment let us put money on one side and concentrate on policy rates, in ‡ation and output. Figure 1 shows the determination of equilibrium in the interest ratein ‡ation space. There are two lines. The …rst, labelled, F E, is the Fisher equation and relates nominal interest rates to expected in ‡ation equiproportionally and so has a slope of 1, see equation (13) . The F E lines cuts the interest rate axis at the natural, or Wicksellian, rate of interest where nominal interest rates equal real interest rates as in ‡ation is zero at this point. It might be argued that at this point there might be a limited degree of money illusion as at zero in ‡ation equilibrium real and nominal changes are identical and so this is a possible long run solution for a monetary economy. The F E line also cuts the in ‡ation axis when nominal rates are zero and in ‡ation is equal to the negative of the real interest rate, = R nat . At this point money balances gives a return equal to the R nat because in ‡ation is negative, which is the socalled Friedmanite maximum, at which point money holdings would be maximised as they do not su¤er an opportunity cost in terms of returns relative to bonds. 15 The second line, is called IRR and represents the reaction of the monetary policy maker to in ‡ation above or below his or her target. I draw the line as an active policy rule. As illustrated in Section 2, equation (13) , the slope of this curve is greater than one and means that policy rates rise (fall) by more than any increase (decrease) in in ‡ation implying that real interest rates rise (fall) in order to induce aggregate demand to move back to the full employment level. As drawn there is a unique equilibrium at the in ‡ation target, T , which is also equal to the level of in ‡ation expectations, e . In this economy what we would therefore expect to see if that, with in ‡ation expectations at target or credibility, interest rates, in ‡ation and output would move in unison around the steady-state: rising and falling together.
In ‡ation and interest rates
In some sense, the equilibrium suggested by Figure 1 is arbitrary as the central bank could easily choose an alternate in ‡ation target and set 15 See Friedman (1969) on this suggestion. interest rates to stabilise in ‡ation around that level. There is a wideranging debate in monetary economics about the appropriate level of in ‡ation target and although there appears to be have been an advanced country consensus for a numerical statement of something in the region of 2%, it is not at all clear whether that consensus will persist. There is a conceptual trade-o¤ that involves deciding, on the one hand, upon a level of in ‡ation that is not so high that prices lose their signalling power and introduce a signi…cant degree of uncertainty into the economy, which will lead to economising on monetary balances and also on the divergence of resources to mitigating that uncertainty. And, on the other hand, to bear in mind that in ‡ation should not be set at so low a level that it starts to impact on the ease of relative price adjustment, as some wages and prices and downwardly rigid, or that the zero bound on nominal interest rates may start to become a signi…cant constraint. 16 Figure 2 appends a lower quadrant to the earlier interest rate-in ‡ation space. It shows the aggregate supply curve, which is determined by equation (5), and Phillips curve, which for a …xed level of in ‡ation expectations shown in the top quadrant, slopes upwards with the parameter, , see equation (2) . I can now assess what happens to the this economy in response to three comparative static shocks: aggregate demand, aggregate supply and in ‡ation expectations.
Aggregate dynamics revisited

A positive shock to demand
Points A and B show the initial equilibrium in Figure 2 . Now imagine that there has been a shock to output demand from something like an increase in wealth, …scal expenditure or some relaxation of credit conditions. 17 Aggregate demand is now in excess of supply at some point C and in ‡ation has increased by (C B) : With …xed in ‡ation expectations, which is really what is meant by the attainment of credibility, the central bank simply raises interest rates to E, given by the IRR slope and at this point real rates are (E D) higher than the natural rate, R nat . The increase in real rates bears down on aggregate demand and the demand converges back to point B with interest rates and in ‡ation determined at A. The demand shocks leads to a temporary in ‡ation, boom and increase in policy rates but at the end of the cycle we are back to where we started from in terms of the level of interest rates and in ‡ation. Figure 3 helps us understand the correct NK policy response to a negative supply shock. From the initial equilibrium at A and B, a negative supply shock shifts the horizontal line in the lower quadrant upwards and takes with it the locus for aggregate demand which also then goes through the new equilibrium point C. Despite the movements in the AS and AD schedules that lead to the determination of a new steady-state level for supply, the level of demand initially remains at point B, which is clearly in excess of capacity. Excess demand drives in ‡ation up and because in ‡ation can jump in this model, see equation (2), in ‡ation will move to D at the same level of excess demand. At D in ‡ation is above target, policy rates are moved up to E, where again real rates are set in excess of the natural rate. The economy then slides down the locus D C and policy rates fall from E to A. In this cycle policy rates and in ‡ation are back to where we started from after a temporary escalation in both but output lies at a permanently lower level.
A negative aggregate supply shock
An escalation in in ‡ation expectations
In Figure 4 we add to the two-quadrant diagram a vertical line in the upper quadrant that represents in ‡ation expectations formed today for in ‡ation in the next period, E t t+1 . They can also be interpreted as longer run in ‡ation expectations and so re ‡ect the level of monetary policy credibility, which is some inverse function of j E t t+1 T j. Initially the economy is at the equilibrium A and B: Now let us suppose that in ‡ation expectations shift to the right because of changes in the monetary constitution such that it is no longer judged that the marginal bene…t and the marginal cost of in ‡ation are equalised at the target. In other words, it is perceived that the monetary policy maker derives some bene…t from elevated in ‡ation. 18 In this case, in ‡ation expectations will be in excess of actual in ‡ation at D and actual real rates will diverge from expected real rates, which have fallen, and output will start to expand towards E from B as there has been an e¤ective loosening of policy.
There are two possible solutions. First, the increase in in ‡ation expectations are accommodated and a new in ‡ation target is set equal to the elevated level of in ‡ation expectations and the AD slides up the AS to cut it at the higher in ‡ation target. That is the economy move to an equilibrium of D and C. At this new in ‡ation target, the economy continues to operate at full capacity and the higher in ‡ation expectations lead to a change in the in ‡ation rate and ultimately to the in ‡ation target. The alternative is more di¢ cult and costly as it requires a signi…cant monetary policy response but also illustrates the importance of having some well understood target for monetary policy. First note that at the new equilibrium CD expected real rates are equal to the natural real rate. And the problem is how to de ‡ate in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations back to the original target. The central bank could have chosen to treat the initial increase in ‡ation expectations as one of in ‡ation and raised rates along the original IRR to point vertically above D and this would have acted to reduce demand from E to B and in ‡ation back to the original equilibrium, A. If on the other hand now that the economy has settled at CD a shift to the old IRR curve will entail a sharp rise in real rates and the maximum size of the recession from this policy, CGB will occur if in ‡ation expectations are sluggish and there is little credibility, on the other hand, in the event that such a policy quickly restores credibility the economy may jump back quickly from C to B. 19 
Two Extensions
Within the context of the framework outlined in the previous section, I can also examine two ongoing monetary policy dilemmas. The …rst is exactly how the zero-lower bound for monetary policy constrains the scope of interest rate reaction with low in ‡ation or even de ‡ation. The second is how exactly a disconnect between money market interest rates and policy rates leads to complications for monetary policy makers.
An application to non-linearity
The di¤erence between the F E line and the IRR line represents the deviation of the real policy rate from the natural rate of interest. And so the triangle ABC Figure 5 represents the force acting on the economy via the choice of the level of interest rates when in ‡ation is below target. As interest rates can rise as high as policy makers wish to place them the opportunity for de ‡ationary impetus is reasonably unconstrained. But once nominal rates start to fall they are constrained to remain at or above a lower bound of zero. And so I plot the possible triangle of real rate choices faced by a policy maker who pursues their interest rate paths in a piece-wise linear fashion, with policy rates falling …rst to zero and then staying there as in ‡ation falls. The x-axis show in ‡ation and the y-axis shows the real interest rate, essentially I simply plot the di¤erence between the F E and IRR curves in in ‡ation-real rate space. Note that at initial equilibrium, A, and at the Friedmanite maximum for money holdings, C, real rates equal the natural or Wicksellian rate.
At the origin, O, nominal rates are zero since both in ‡ation and the real rate is zero. Triangle OBD represents the region over which negative interest rates pertain. The policy maker is able to drive real rates down only to point B, after which real rates will rise, as in ‡ation can fall but nominal rates cannot. But note that real rates along ABC are all below the natural rate and are therefore acting to stimulate the economy. The issue then is whether in ‡ation will fall below R nat after which it will act to further bear down on demand and whether the increasing real rates over the range BC will be su¢ cient to stabilise a de ‡ating economy. If not then other monetary policy tools will have to be considered. The Japanese experience since the collapse of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s led to a prolonged debate about how to deal with de ‡ation and led to the suggestion of a number of complementary tools to monetary policy, for example, exchange rate devaluation or the underfunding of government …scal de…cits. The question for policy makers is thus simply does the triangle ABC place su¢ cient stabilisation policy in the hands of the policy maker when in ‡ation lies in the range = R nat to T ? Or should more extreme responses be engendered early in any de ‡ationary episode, so that the slope of the line AB is even more negative i.e. real rates are pushed down very quickly so as to minimise the possibility of a increasing real rates as in ‡ation falls i.e. BC. I leave it to the reader to draw his or her preferred path for rates but it may well not be linear.
An application to the money market
As the name suggests the two quadrant diagram can be extended with two further quadrants. In Figure 6 we add one quadrant for determining market interest rates with a premium over the policy rate and the second as a clearing condition for the money market based on market rather than policy rates. Let us …rst suggest that the market interest rate has an external …nance premium, ef p, over the policy rate and so we draw a EF P line in the top left-hand quadrant, which simply states that the market interest rate, R m = R n + ef p. The magnitude of the ef p has been explored in various papers and is likely to vary cyclically over the business cycle to re ‡ect market risk. 20 Note that in a NK framework the risk premium can be directly linked to the state of the economy and can be thought of as re ‡ecting the marginal costs of loan supply to the private sector and may well be highly correlated with the business cycle such that …nancial intermediaries may perceive their costs of loan supply to fall in an expansion and rise in a recession, meaning that risk premia are counter-cyclical and act to amplify the business cycle.
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In equilibrium the supply of money is set by the full employment level of output (see equation 18) and money demand is decreasing in the level of market interest rates with a slope term re ‡ecting the interest rate elasticity of demand for money, . At equilibrium, point ABCD, in ‡ation is at target, = T , output is at its full employment level, y =ỹ, and money demand equals money supply, M d = M s at the policy rate and the market interest rate, R n and R ef p . Now let us suppose that the external …nance premia is driven upwards as perceptions of risk in the market economy increase and this reduces the supply of money (or liquidity) at each given market rate. The EF P then jumps up with a new intercept, where ef p 0 > ef p. In the absence of a fall of velocity induced by higher market interest rates, which would drive the demand curve outwards, the money market will now clear at a higher level of market rates and a lower level of observed nominal money supply, that is EF . But the higher market interest rates and lower money supply will set up a de ‡ationary impetus to the economy as scarce liquidity will drive demand down relative to capacity, G, and in ‡ation will fall. The policy rate is thus cut to H in order to o¤set the increase in market interest rates, which induces a temporary in ‡ation and ouught to cause both the money supply and demand curves to shift out to a new equilibrium, I, at the higher market interest rate. So when money markets disconnect policy rates, output and in ‡ation may eventually return to their long run level but there has to be a temporary o¤set of the higher market interest rates by the policy marker.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have outlined a simple macroeconomic model that underpins much of modern macroeconomic analysis. Although not developed here at great length, the main equations (1) to (6) can all be derived from the …rst principles of household constrained optimisation. I have shown that the path for output and for in ‡ation are determined by the arguments in the central bank's policy rule. Under such a rule we also show that money and the price level are well determined. One key feature of this model is that output and in ‡ation are forward-looking and respond to the expected path of real interest rates and output respectively. I also show that the monetary policy reaction function does imply a trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation because increasing (reducing) output has an in ‡ationary (de ‡ationary) implication.
I then transfer the key elements of this model to a series of simple diagrammatic expositions that are suitable for undergraduate study. Speci…cally, we analyse the equilibrium for interest rates and in ‡ation and the slope of the monetary policy reaction function. We are also able to use the diagram to illustrate the multiplicity of possible equilibria, for example, an in ‡ation target can be set at any point from the Freidmanite minimum upwards, and the relationship from this space to that of in ‡ation-output, which is simultaneously determined. The correct policy response to demand and supply shocks are considered as is that to the possibility that in ‡ation expectations may become dislodged from target and I leave to the student the analysis of what to do if the natural rate of interest changes. Finally we examine some limitations of this tool by considering the limits to the correct policy response as a result of a zero bound constraint on the nominal interest rate and also the possibility that disruption to money markets may cause market rates to disconnect from policy rates.
This chapter takes the intermediate student to the point of understanding more fully many of the issues currently occupying monetary theorists and practioners. That is what are the key equation required to understand more fully the aggregate economic system and how the choice of monetary policy rule plays a crucial role in the system's dynamics. Underpinning much of this work is the observation that it is not possible to understand aggregate dynamics of a monetary economy without reference to monetary policy and the level of credibility it has bestowed upon it. The model structure thus outlined takes the Lucas (1996) critique seriously. Ultimately the student who understands the key role of policy rules, targets and beliefs in determining a monetary equilibrium is better equipped to understand how issues such as learning, uncertainty, robust rules, min-max objectives and so forth play their way out of a basic New Keynesian macroeconomic model. 
And so now note that for a matrix where both roots are outside the unit circle:
T race(A) = 1 + 2 > 2:
Because both roots must be greater than 1, then the following condition must also hold:
which expands to: 
And so providing the nominal interest rate increases by more than any in ‡ationary shock, the economy can be stabilised around any given in ‡ation target. In other words given an in ‡ationary shock providing the real interest rate increases, in ‡ation can be brought back to target by inducing a reduction in demand and so a closing of any output gap. I have illustrated this form on monetary policy response, which is termed active, in Figure 1 of the main text.
A.3 Optimality
Let us append a simple loss function to the trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation:
This form of loss function for equal weights on ! y = ! will imply indi¤erence curves that are a series of concentric circles around the point where in ‡ation is at target and output is equal to its ‡ex-price level, the so-called 'bliss-point'. Typically the bliss point used to be thought to lie to the right of the ‡ex-price level of output, thereby bringing about a bias into monetary policy to try and get to a higher indi¤erence curve. The so-called 'in ‡ation bias'stemmed from this perception (Nordhaus, 1995) .
We can also use the loss function in (14) alongside the Phillips curve, which we can interpret as setting the rate of exchange between current period in ‡ation and output, to analyse the slope of the monetary policy reaction function in output-in ‡ation space. Let us start from some point where there is a negative output gap, y < 0, and evaluate the gain from increasing y; 22 which will be simply given by ! y y y. The resulting loss from increasing output will increase in ‡ation, via the Phillips curve, which will be given by, ! y: Now equating the marginal cost to the marginal bene…t any outcome for in ‡ation and output must satisfy the following constraint:
Equation (15) thus shows the slope of the optimal monetary policy reaction function in in ‡ation-output space. The rate of transformation, or slope, is given by the slope of the Phillips curve, , and the relative weight on output or in ‡ation in the loss function, (14) . Finally note that the form of the loss function will determine the optimal monetary policy reaction function in output-in ‡ation space. For example if we only worry about large deviations of output or in ‡ation from target rather than all deviations, the policy reaction function will be ‡at over some range and then react aggressively when it is in some danger of being breachedthis is a form of min-max reaction. 
